Archimedes claimed that, from a fixed point, with a long enough lever, he would be able to move the earth. See here.
Both were correct. History is collective human activity and individuals, like cogs, can move masses. An individual can redirect a political party that can lead a class that can change a country that can transform international alliances and the world economy. Lenin succeeded so far but was knocked back.
This is relevant to the idea of time travel. See Individuals. I hope to post on the extent of the contribution of Saul/Paul. See Sacrifice And Resurrection In Faith And Fiction.
Politics is particularly vulnerable to small fluctuations because the number of individuals making important decisions is limited, sometimes very limited.
ReplyDeleteStudying the beginning of WW1, I've come to the conclusion that during the crucial months in 1914, about 20 men in the Central Powers made the decision for war.
Two were hereditary monarchs, and most of the rest were generals and aristocratic politicians -- the one without "von" in his name was Count Tisa, because Magyars don't use "von".
And there was a 'crucial absence"; Franz Ferdinand, who had been absolutely opposed to a general war because he thought it would destroy the Dual Monarchy. FF's opinion had been crucial because he was heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and the monarch still controlled foreign and military policy decisions.
There were a number of "necessary but not sufficient" factors -- the strong nationalism of the period, various longstanding national rivalries, the arms race, and so forth.
But these merely -allowed- those 20 men to decide on a general war among the Great Powers. The decision was theirs.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteI basically agree with your comments. My chief caveat being how I have also read that none of the major powers WANTED a war. So, wouldn't that also have been the predominant view of these 20 men? In that case, HOW did WW I break out? After all, I have read as well of of Wilhelm II, deep down, did not want a war and tried hard to prevent it. So, what went wrong?
Yes, Francis Ferdinand, was opposed to any war, for good sound reasons. And even if they did not get along well, his views matched those of his aged uncle, Francis Joseph, on that.
Sean
FF was also influential in the Austrian army and upper politics; everyone knew his uncle wasn't going to live much longer.
ReplyDeleteAs to whether the powers wanted a war, that depends on how you define "want".
Some influential institutions and individuals definitely did want a war; Conrad, the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, proposed attacks on Serbia, Italy or both about 13 times in the last few years before the war broke out. There was a strong element in the Foreign Office which agreed with him.
The German General Staff also did definitely want a preventative war -- they thought that Russia's growing strength would make it impossible for Germany to win beyond about 1916/17, and they were convinced the Entente wanted to humiliate and/or destroy Germany. This was wrong, but it was more or less an example of the universal human tendency to project your own desires on others.
Wilhelm was bellicose, but also a bit of a blowhard and faint-heart. He was always bellowing threats and then backing down; quite notorious for it, in fact.
In 1914, the General Staff and Foreign Office got him to agree to give Austria-Hungary unconditional backing; for one thing he was genuinely fond of FF (perhaps the only man in Europe who was) and was shocked at his death. He'd also planned to work closely with FF once he came to the throne.
He also thought -- and was led to believe -- that with German backing, Vienna could crush the Serbs without Russia daring to intervene.
Then he went on his usual summer cruise; the generals deliberately encouraged him to do that, to "show confidence:", and they may have sabotaged his communications with Berlin. They certainly carefully controlled them.
When he came back, he tried to back out several times -- to switch the attack to Russia alone, or get Austria to accept the Serb reply to their ultimatum.
The generals talked or bullied him out of that; he was also uneasily aware that everything thought he'd chicken out and blink, as he had previously, and he knew that the right wing and the nationalist organizations in Germany were beginning to regard him as a coward. With the growth of the Socialists, he couldn't afford to alienate them.
He was also genuinely shocked and enraged when the British came in on the side of the Entente, which he regarded as a betrayal.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteI sit corrected, there were powerful who wanted a war or at least thought they could win such a war. I think the fatal mistake was Wilhelm II agreeing to that unconditional backing of Austria-Hungary. Absent that even Conrad might not have been so hot on war with Serbia.
And the German General Staff and some of the top generals should have been put in their places! Their job was to execute and implement policies and strategies the Kaiser and the civilian politicians had determined on, not make strategic decisions of that magnitude. Because a too narrow focus on a strictly military solution to one's problems has its own dangers.
Controlling, censoring, or sabotaging the Kaiser's communications with Berlin? Shocking! I might even call it treasonous!
Yes, I have heard of how Francis Ferdinand and Wilhelm II were very good friends. And how the Kaiser was sincerely grieved by FF's murder.
I have read of how the Germans had been counting of the UK being too paralyzed by the Irish Home Rule crisis to intervene effectively in Europe. The British finding a temporary patch up of the crisis was a shock. Another miscalculation by the General Staff.
Sean
Sean: Germany was not a constitutional state in 1914. The "cabinet" officials were not responsible to the legislature and not dependent on support or votes there; they were appointed by the Kaiser and answered to him alone.
ReplyDeleteFurthermore, in the Prussian/German tradition, the General Staff had distinct political aspects and a political role -- they were not neutral servants.
A strong Kaiser could dominate his servants, or a strong Chancellor (particularly one working with a strong Chief of the General Staff) could dominate the government, as Bismarck and the older von Molkte had done.
Wilhelm was weak but had a weak man's harshness -- he couldn't really rule effectively himself, but he was afraid (having experienced Bismarck!) of having strong subordinates who might dominate him.
As a result, the Reich's government in that era was a badly-coordinated mess, with organizations clashing and little coordination and a lot of backstairs intrigue and camarillas and so forth.
It was the great weakness of Bismarck's system: it required a Bismarck to run it, and men like that are rare.
As an English observer said at the time, the Germans were tremendously effective when they had good leadership; when they didn't, there was hell to pay.
ReplyDeleteAlso note that the Prussian military tradition emphasized risk-taking and seizing sudden opportunities by bold, ruthless action that tolerated a lot of downside risks if things went wrong.
ReplyDeleteThey called it "rolling the iron dice" -- literally gambling with the future.
They didn't think they were -assured- of a victory over the Entente; they were far too competent a set of professional soldiers to do that.
They thought that they had a -chance- of victory, and that the direction of likely change was moving against them, so they'd never have a better opportunity.
Hence also the fact that their strike was one aimed at absolutely crushing and destroying Germany's rivals, not just giving them a set-back; they wanted to break France and Russia forever, so that they'd never have the capacity to threaten German hegemony in Europe again.
*Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteGermany was not quite a constitutional monarchy in 1914, and where the General Staff and High Command were neutral servants? True, but I think Germany was starting to become like that. Mere existence of the Reichstag and political parties of right and left sitting in it was a telling sign of things to come.
But I agree, the political system Bismarck created could only work under either a strong Kaiser or Chancellor. And that's too much to ask of most of us, who are definitely not going to be Bismarcks!
It's all very well to think hard and seriously about taking risks. But the General Staff should have grasped that if Germany did NOT crush its enemies with a single overwhelming blow, but got bogged down in a war of attrition, then the odds of victory starts dropping fast. In that case the best outcome for Germany would have been a compromise peace wherein she kept most, but not all of her gains. That, I think, was what Austria-Hungary, under Emperor Karl, wanted to do in 1917-18.
Sean
Sean: they were aware that a war of attrition put the odds against them, but their basic instinct was always to double-down on a bet. Eg., they invaded Belgium knowing it might well bring Britain into the war, but gambled that they'd beat France before British intervention became important. Then they gambled on unrestricted U-boat warfare knocking out the British before the American entry into the war it provoked could become decisive.
ReplyDeleteThey knew the downside; they took the risks anyway.
And once the war had started, the political commitment of all sides, and the political debts the leadership of all sides had accumulated with their peoples, made it virtually impossible to stop short of actual collapse.
Russia dropped out of the war only after a very complete change of regime -- and even so, Lenin had terrible trouble getting even the Bolshevik Party to go along with his "revolutionary defeatism". Even Trotsky wanted to gamble everything on a "revolutionary war", essentially the same risk Kerensky had taken, with a more radical gloss.
Lenin could do that because he genuinely had no attachment to the interests or identity of Russia as a nation or the Russian people, both of which he believed were unimportant ephiphenomena to be manipulated or dismissed according to strictly tactical considerations. Yet that viewpoint was rare even in his own party.
It was virtually impossible for any of the contending Great Powers to make such sacrifices and then accept a "cabinet peace" of limited losses/gains. The leaders rightly feared they would be overthrown if they did so.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteThe trouble with the bets Germany took as regards the invasion of *Belgium and a provocative submarine war with the UK was that Germany lost those bets! The UK still came to France's assistance in a massive way and the UK still declared war on the Central Powers in
1917. Which makes me wonder, what might have happened if Germany had stayed out of Belgium and remained totally on the defensive in 1814? France, by herself, could never have defeated Germany, and would have suffered horribly trying to break thru German defenses near the borders. Instead Germany could have focused on beating Russia first before turning on France. The Eastern Front, due to its geography, never became as hopelessly deadlocked as the Western.
I agree, the passions aroused by the war made it almost impossible for the leaders of the warring powers to have second thoughts, to decide that a compromise "cabinet" peace was preferable to the increasingly difficult goal of TOTAL victory.
Leaders on both sides feared being overthrown if they suggested a compromise peace? But refusing to at least think of a cabinet peace and go for total victory still ran the high risk of being overthrown if they lost!
Yes, I have read of how that monster, Lenin, with his callous contempt for the Russian people, had great difficulty getting his Bolsheviks to accept the ignominious Brest-Litovsk treaty.
I noted with great interest how you had Nicholas II abdicating in September 1916 and being succeeded by his son Alexis II (under the regency of Grand Duke Nicholas), instead of the botched abdication in March 1917. In an excess of paternal concern Nicholas set aside his son (despite the leaders of the Duma expecting, and perhaps desiring Alexis' accession), in favor of his brother Michael. The delays, arguments, etc., about Michael succeeding led to the complete collapse of the monarchy and the accession of a weak Provisional Government.
That might not have mattered if either Prince George Lvov or Alexander Kerensky had had the wit to realize Russia's best interests would be served by either making peace with German/Austria or mercilessly crushing Lenin.
Sean
Drat, I meant the US entered the Great War in 1917, in my first paragraph, immediately above. And I meant to write "1914" when I wondered what might have happened if Germany had not invaded Belgium/France in that year.
ReplyDeleteSean